![]() ![]() During the 1954–1955 crisis in the Taiwan Strait, China bombarded the nearby offshore islands, and the United States came incorrectly to fear that Beijing was planning to attack Taiwan. Nevertheless, Eisenhower and Dulles believed their implicit nuclear threats had made a difference. More decisive factors in ending the war were the death of Soviet leader Josef Stalin, the eventual flexibility of Communist negotiators, and the conventional bombing of North Korea by the United States. Although Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sent messages to Moscow and New Delhi in the hope that they would reach Beijing, his threats were vaguely general in nature: the United States could take stronger military action and “extend area conflict.” To this day, it is unclear whether those messages reached Beijing or were understood as nuclear threats. One political narrative that acquired near-legendary status was the claim that the Eisenhower administration had broken the Korean War diplomatic logjam by using nuclear threats against China. Eisenhower’s administration considered nuclear options as integral to crisis diplomacy and military planning. President Harry Truman authorized the deployment of nuclear weapons components to Guam, although he otherwise saw military use of nuclear weapons as virtually “taboo.” Rejecting the idea of proscribed weapons, President Dwight D. During the Korean War, as a signal to China and the Soviet Union, U.S. How did that come about?ĭuring the Cold War, the possession of nuclear weapons emboldened some national leaders to make threats that they thought would advance their positions in a crisis by coercing or deterring their adversaries. Such threats became generally irrelevant during the later years of the Cold War and after. The recent brandishing of nuclear threats evokes the Cold War days of the 1950s and early 1960s, when such threats, were the modus operandi of superpower conduct during international crises. Putin said that anyone who stood in the way of the assault would face consequences “such as you have never seen in your entire history.” A few days later, he put Russian strategic forces on “special combat readiness.” That nuclear threats can be made today is a shock to those who thought the end of the Cold War had made them historical curiosities. The implied nuclear threats that Russian President Vladimir Putin made to the United States and NATO in March as he pressed his full-scale invasion of Ukraine were also startling. ![]() President Donald Trump’s “fire and fury” threats to North Korea were shocking. For that reason, explicit threats and the raising of nuclear alert levels have become rare since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.Ĭhinese nuclear threats against Japan and U.S. All the same, making a nuclear threat is unusual and alarming. Such threats are the essence of deterrence: if you attack, we will destroy your society or your most vital military assets. Implicit or explicit nuclear threats have been the default position of states possessing nuclear weapons for decades. ![]()
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